As a one year CRJ Captain, about six years ago, I
taxied the jet out of the Philadelphia regional jet ramp late one evening for
Binghamton, New York. This was the first
trip with this particular First Officer, and we were getting along great
together. He had many good qualities,
and you don’t always find well rounded FO’s (or Captains) on the line. Many times one is able to determine (or hear
on the line) that each pilot has a few areas which are their strengths, but
there is one area where the other crewmembers would be wise to ‘cover them’
on. It’s a wise and professional tactic
to practice, and if you do it in the right way it does not disrespect the other
crewmember at all; on the contrary it makes your ‘team’ stronger.
Jay appeared to be strong in all areas; but there was still one
corner in which I thought I might have to be careful in, and that was in taking
his suggestions. He was pretty assertive
for a First Officer and a little cavalier (he had a lot of confidence which seemed
to give him leeway), but he used the right tact and balance in communicating
with me. During our flights we had been
conversing, mostly out of “sterile cockpit”, about all kinds of subjects –
politics, company goings-on, our pilots union, and religion (and his lack of
faith in my Jesus), and we had a pretty good time doing so, in spite of our
differences on matters of faith.
Really, we probably talked too much, in places where we
shouldn’t have been. I can’t recall how
much the sterile cockpit rule was bent, but I’ve learned over the years that heated
conversation during periods out of sterile cockpit can leave a pilots mind
remain focused on the subject relatively long after sterile cockpit is entered
again. This is where discipline could
and should come into play (not talking about subjects not pertaining to the
flight at hand), and an area I try to focus on more these days. I say ‘these days’ because as the years roll
on, things happen, things that make you think twice about how disciplined you
really are in your duties, and how you would like to be matches us with the
reality.
It was late, a quarter till eleven, when we were given the
“cross two-seven right, right turn on sierra, contact tower one one eight point
five” clearance. We continued south on
taxiway Echo and followed the snaking, right left right path of taxiway Sierra,
my left hand on the tiller steering the pointy end of the CRJ toward the rows
of the orange lights of the UPS ramp nearby runway two-seven left.
Whatever non-pertaining conversation there was (couldn’t
have been much) stopped suddenly when Philly Tower gave our takeoff clearance,
“cleared for takeoff runway two-seven left”.
My ‘strong in all areas’ first officer repeated the clearance back to the Tower, and I
called out “Flaps eight before takeoff checklist”, which we quickly completed,
leaving a two hundred yard straight section of taxiway Sierra, headed west,
before a quick left and very short taxi segment on taxiway Sierra One (S1) to
get on runway two-seven left, and then a sharp right turn to align with the runway
for takeoff (see the airport diagram below).
|
Philadelphia International - Taxiway S1 and Runway 27L on center lower half, near control tower |
We made the left turn and started to cross the hold short
line for runway two-seven left. I had
made this turn many times, and only as a Captain. Because S1 was a very short taxi segment
before the hold short line, it was tricky to visually check the final approach
of runway two-seven left for traffic before actually crossing the hold short
line for the runway. Not to worry,
though, we had good men with good intentions looking out for us; the control
tower was close enough that we could still see their silhouettes in the cab during
the day. Many times, but not always,
before this evening I would delay making the turn until the last moment in
order to make a sharper turn, which would give us more room to visually check
that there is no traffic on the final approach course before the jet’s nose
crossed the hold short line that marked the boundary between the taxiway and
runway.
“Tower are they going to get out of our way in time?” The clearly and quickly spoken words by the
female UPS pilot alerted us to a major problem, simultaneously as I got over my
disbelief and did a triple take with my eyes, observing the multiple bright
lights of a Boeing 757 on short final of our runway, and their runway also,
two-seven left (27L). My synapses snapped
into overdrive, suddenly thinking as quickly as possible. There was no time to wonder
about why this was happening, no time to deny or delay the reality of the
moment, no time to escape from the sudden pressure of the situation. A huge airplane about a half mile to our left
and about two hundred feet above the ground would be right where we were in less than
fifteen seconds.
The need for a pilot to check the final approach is a primary safety directive taught from a student’s first flight: always visually check that the final approach is clear before you take the runway for takeoff. By this evening I had about six thousand hours of flight time, and I had never been in another aircraft’s way on the runway.
Fortunately I didn't freeze. Because they were so close and we still weren’t aligned with
the runway and wouldn’t have started the turn to do that for another ten
seconds, there was absolutely no way we could have taken off and cleared the runway in time. That was a no
brainer, and postflight that made me think the UPS pilot’s words were a polite (and
surprised) way of asking the control tower to make us clear the runway so that
they did not have to abandon the approach and execute a go-around.
|
Runway boundary constituted by 'holding positions markings' shown - FAA AIM |
Because the nose and our cockpit was already past the hold
short line and we were technically on the runway even though the plane wasn’t past
the runway edge lines (see FAA AIM diagram above), I didn't let my feet ever touch the brakes. I saw my escape across the runway to the other side of taxiway “Sierra One” and started to advance the thrust levers. We could sort
out the taxi back to the runway after we got out of the way.
With a stuttered surprise, the tower controller ordered urgently: “Exit the runway at Sierra Two”. He owed us that much at least, after clearing
our aircraft to take off while having already cleared one to land, and creating
a serious safety risk all at once.
At that point I didn’t know if Sierra Two was straight ahead
or where, I just wanted to ‘get away’ and have a snickers, so to speak. “To the right, to the right!” My First Officer urgently yelled and motioned
in reply to my question regarding Sierra Two: “is that straight?” I gunned the thrust levers halfway up, made
a quick right turn down the runway halfway between the edge and the centerline,
found Sierra Two (S2) and turned off clear of the runway, back eastbound,
again on Sierra. We watched the big,
long 757 with cool customers driving it land just as we finished the turn on Sierra. They braked normally and took
the left turnoff from the runway at taxiway Yankee (Y) just like nothing had happened. But something had just
happened, something bad. The control
tower had cleared us for takeoff, directly conflicting with another aircraft they
had already cleared to land. We had just
experienced a moment you do not want to have, ever, as a pilot.
The tower did not miss a beat, in spite of knowing their
mistake. I should say his mistake,
although I don't know the staffing at that hour but I assumed the tower was minimally staffed with one
controller for the tower and one for ground, and no manager backing either of
them up. He was businesslike as he
stated to us “you are still cleared for takeoff, runway two-seven right”. Still cleared for takeoff. No takeoff clearance cancellation had been
given, in spite of us severely cramping some big iron’s style on short
final. He should’ve cancelled our
takeoff clearance, and I thought during our climbout that he didn’t because (1)
he didn’t want that to be on the ATC tapes, and (2) he didn’t want to perform
any possible paperwork required, (3) he didn’t have time to either. He knew what he was doing, except for that
one moment, and that’s all you need is a moment, unfortunately.
My First Officer and I talked a lot about this on the way up
to Binghamton, New York, that night.
How did that happen?
I didn’t visually clear the final approach path, and the tower probably
had cleared the 757 to land before we had switched to the tower frequency. Runway 27L is not usually used for landings,
except by UPS at night when it provides them a short taxi to their nearby
ramp. I didn’t have my guard up for that
possibility. I have a theory that at
some point the controller couldn’t see the 757 because the approach path
position of the 757 made it to become blocked from view by the control tower
cab roof, unless the controller gets up close to the windows. The controller had a moment of inattention and
permitted himself to be distracted.
Controller fatigue could have been a factor. They could have had reduced staffing and
fewer controllers to back each other up.
I asked: should we report the controller’s mistake? It would surely get him in trouble. We wondered if they had an immunity program
to write a report about their mistakes and be given protection from discipline
or termination (they didn’t at that time).
Reporting him would force us to admit we didn’t clear the runway
visually before entering it, and we wondered about what that meant for us. We could call him when we arrived at Binghamton
and asked for an explanation, he probably had a ready apology.
What do you think I did, reader, at the end of the flight
and end of the night? What would you have done,
and why? Let’s start a little
discussion.
Learn from my lesson: always, always, always clear your
runway before you cross the hold short line, control tower or not! My favorite quote from Ronald Reagan applies
here: “Trust but Verify”.
God bless you, and thanks for reading my blog!